> On Thu, 31 Oct 1996 01:40:06 -0600 (CST) zaimoni@ksu.edu writes:
>
> >
> >On the other hand, Absolute Truth is so much more concrete than the
> >lesser varieties, that it is plausibly ludicrous to claim that
> >Absolute
> >Truth is describable as a proposition. I.e., Absolute Truth does not
> >obviously have a truth value, since it is constructed as a noun rather
> >
> >than as a sentence--declarative, question, or exclamation.
> >
> >In this sense, Absolute Truth could be a proper part of Objective
> >Reality
> >[perhaps what Objective Reality takes foundation in.]
>
>
> Your claim about absolute truth in the conext of this post "is
> constructed as a noun rather than as a sentence--declarative, question,
> or exclamation." That noun, however, refers to a sentence, and that
> sentence has a truth value. ....
The first clause is where we diverge. I wouldn't have made my claim if
I had accepted it. There seems to be a definition-clash, aggravated by
the nature of (and assumptions I bring to) my work.
I agree that Absolute Truth can be described by such a sentence. There's
a potential metalinguistic confusion, and some workaround/solution is useful.
Evidently you have one, and I don't [yet].
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/ Towards the conversion of data into information....
/
/ Kenneth Boyd
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