>While I think it's usefull to subjectively agree what a "statement" is...I
>don't think that changing the interpretation of "statements are either
>falsifiable, axiomatic or tautological" falsifies my intent: Which is
that
>*everything* is either falsifiable, axiomatic or tautological. Obviously,
>if something is senseless it is falsifiable.
How do you falsify that statement, "colorless green ideas sleep
furiously"? True and false do not even apply.
(There might be a problem with agreeing on definitions for 'falsifiable',
which I take to mean, "possibly true, but not necessarily true". But
sometimes it gets interpreted it as either "not true" or "definitely
refutable".)
> I already addressed
>exclamations, questions, and commands...I won't go there again, not easily
>(no matter what Eva calls them).
But when you said that commands are falsifiable since they are the same as
questions since they are " implied questions", it's like saying day is the
same as night since day implies night. If you can take anything and show
how since it implies anything else, you are functioning off the meaningless
tautological premise that "anything is anything".
The difference between 'statements' and commands, exclamations, etc. is
that statements say something directly about the "state" of affairs.
Commands, exclamations, etc. just imply something indirectly about the
state of affairs.
--David R.